

## **Potential Indicators of Proliferation Financing**

- (a) The customer is vague and resistant to providing additional information when asked;
- (b) The customer's activity does not match its business profile or the end-user information does not match the end-user's business profile;
- (c) The transaction involves designated persons;
- (d) The transaction involves higher risk jurisdictions which are known to be involved in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or proliferation financing activities;
- (e) The transaction involves other financial institutions with known deficiencies in AML/CFT controls or controls for combating proliferation financing;
- (f) The transaction involves possible shell companies (e.g. companies that do not have a high level of capitalisation or display other shell company indicators);
- (g) The transaction involves containers whose numbers have been changed or ships that have been renamed;
- (h) The shipment of goods takes a circuitous route or the financial transaction is structured in a circuitous manner;
- (i) The transaction involves the shipment of goods inconsistent with normal geographic trade patterns (e.g. the country involved would not normally export or import such goods);
- (j) The transaction involves the shipment of goods incompatible with the technical level of the country to which goods are being shipped (e.g. semiconductor manufacturing equipment shipped to a country with no electronics industry); or
- (k) There are inconsistencies in the information provided in trade documents and financial flows (e.g. in the names, companies, addresses, ports of call and final destination).

## **Other Sources of Guidance on Proliferation Financing**

The FATF has also provided guidance on measures to combat proliferation financing. You may wish to refer to the [FATF website](#) for additional information.